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Abstract
We investigate the impact of Chinese superstition on prices paid by Chinese home buyers in
Seattle, Washington. Chinese consider 8 lucky and 4 unlucky. Empirical results indicate Chinese buyers pay a 1-2% premium for addresses including an 8 and a 1% discount for addresses
including a 4. These results are unrelated to unobserved property quality: no premium exists
when Chinese sell to non-Chinese. Absent explicit identiers for Chinese individuals, we develop a binomial name classier using methods from the biomedical and document classication
literature, allowing for falsication tests using other ethnic groups and mitigating ambiguity
attributable to transliteration of Chinese characters into the Latin alphabet.
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The students assimilated too well into American society. The elders back home felt that
they were beginning to lose a lot of the traditional Chinese culture, getting too far away
from the Confucian Analects
 Shawn Wong, Becoming American: The Chinese Experience
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Introduction

Anecdotal and empirical evidence exists that superstitions held by economic agents aect real estate
market outcomes. For example, less than 5% of condo buildings in New York City contain a 13th oor
as 13 is considered an unlucky number in Western Culture.1 Conversely, a Lucky Seven Road can be
found in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Idaho and Texas. Of course, superstitions  cultural preferences
or norms related to numbers, circumstances, or events  are incompatible with standard models
of rational economic decisions. This study investigates preferences for lucky or unlucky numbers
specic to Chinese culture  hereafter Chinese superstition  in an American real estate market.
We nd that individuals with a Chinese cultural background  hereafter Chinese  pay a premium
(discount) for residential properties with addresses that include lucky (unlucky) numbers in Chinese
superstition.
The Chinese words for 8 (八 , ba) and wealth / prosperity (发 , fa) are phonetically similar. It
is not surprising that in Chinese superstition, the number 8 is widely believed to be the most lucky
of all single digits. In contrast, the number 4 is considered unlucky as the words for 4 (四, sì) and

death (死 , s) are also phonetically similar. It is possible that Chinese who live in America retain
their cultural heritage and its associated superstition. It is also possible that some or all Chinese have
completely or partially assimilated into American culture and no longer retain cultural superstition.
We test these competing hypothesis by analyzing real estate transaction prices based on the digits
contained in addresses for single-family homes in the Seattle, Washington metro area. Seattle is an
ideal setting for research on Chinese superstition and real estate prices in America as it has been a
prime destination for Chinese immigrants since the 1860s and, relative to the rest of the country,
contains a large number of Chinese home buyers and sellers.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study is the rst to investigate
1

Sanette Tanaka, A 13th Floor Condo? No Such Luck, Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2013
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eects of Chinese superstition in an American real estate market. Other studies have documented
the relevance of Chinese superstitions in the real estate markets of China and elsewhere.2 Our
results indicate that Chinese superstition is portable and still relevant among Chinese living in
America. Second, this study identies eects of Chinese superstition at the individual-level using
buyer and seller names. With the exception of Agarwal et al. (2016), previous research has identied
property-level eects using properties located in geographic areas with many Chinese residents.
Using individual-level data, we nd Chinese buyers alone responsible for premiums related to lucky
numbers in Chinese superstition and no evidence of discounts attributable to unlucky numbers.
In order to determine if Chinese pay a premium or discount for properties based on the presence
of specic numbers in addresses, it is rst necessary to identify whether or not a buyer or seller is
Chinese. Despite myriad housing attributes available in data provided by county assessor oces, to
the best of the authors knowledge, no assessor data set exists that identies the ethnicity of the buyer
or seller.3 However, many assessor oce data sets include buyer and seller names. We capitalize on
the availability of buyer and seller names and develop a binomial classier that classies individuals
as Chinese or non-Chinese based on name. In order to train our classier, we use a supervised
learning algorithm and a labeled data set of Chinese and American participants in the Summer
Olympic Games from 1948 to 2012. Intuitively, the binomial classier is based on the frequency of
a given name in the Chinese rosters relative to the frequency of that name in the US rosters. Our
procedure is developed using publicly available data sources. The programs are available at the links
below and from the authors upon request.4
Because names and genetics are passed on from one generation to the next, procedures for
identifying ethnicity have been extensively studied in the biomedical eld and are known in general
as name-ethnicity matching or, when only the surname is used, surname-ethnicity matching. In
general, the researcher imputes ethnicity using a pre-specied dictionary of names associated with a
given ethnicity. Constructing a dictionary of names using frequent names within an ethnic group or
2
Notable studies include Bourassa and Peng (1999), Chau et al. (2001), Shum et al. (2014), Fortin et al. (2014),
and Agarwal et al. (2016)
3
The authors have worked with assessor data sets from Seattle, Washington; Phoenix, Arizona; Richmond, Virginia; Denver, Colorado; Boulder, Colorado; Spokane, Washington; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.
4
A copy of the data and classication program is available from the authors upon request and at
Program: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/62967289/olympic%20names%20china.R
Auxiliary Program: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/62967289/fastTDM.R
Olympic Roster Data: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/62967289/olympicRosters.csv
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frequent names relative to other ethnic groups can be problematic in this setting as many Chinese
names are identical to Korean, Vietnamese, and English surnames when Romanized (Quan et al.,
2006).5 For instance, (张, chang) is a common name in China with Wade-Giles Romanization chang,
while in Korea, 장 is a common name with McCuneReischauer Romanization chang.67 Because of
this, out-of-sample mis-classication is possible when the classier is trained using only two reference
groups: Chinese and non-Chinese. Based on this ambiguity in the Romanized names, we describe a
multinomial classier than can be used to classify names as either Chinese, US American, or Korean.
The results indicate that Chinese buyers pay a 1.7% premium for properties that include an 8
in the address. We provide evidence that this premium does not reect unobserved quality of the
underlying property as Chinese sellers do not command a premium for properties with an 8 in the
address. On the other hand, we nd mild evidence that Chinese buyers pay a 1.2% discount for
addresses that end in a 4. These results provide the rst evidence that Chinese superstitions impact
transaction prices in an American real estate market. A falsication test nds no evidence that
Korean buyers pay a premium for homes with addresses containing an 8. In the context of cultural
assimilation in America, we nd evidence that Chinese preferences for specic numbers are durable
and long-lived, even for minority residents in a city with a multiplicity of cultural preferences and
backgrounds.

2

Literature Review

2.1 Superstition and Real Estate
Previous research examined the role of superstition in the market for apartments in Hong Kong and
mainland China. Chau et al. (2001) analyze data from Hong Kong and nd apartments on oor
8 sell at a 2.5% premium, while apartments on oor 4 do not sell at a signicant discount. Shum
et al. (2014) analyze data from Chengdu, a provincial capital city in Western China, and nd that
5

Romanization refers to the transliteration of non-Latin characters using the Latin alphabet.
Wade-Giles and McCuneReischauer are Romanization systems for Chinese and Korean characters, respectively.
7
There have been two main systems of Romanization of Chinese characters in the 20th century. WadeGiles, the
system of transcription in the English-speaking world for most of the 20th century, was developed during the mid-19th
century. In 1958, the Pinyin system ocially replaced the WadeGiles system across mainland China and continued
to replace Wade-Giles in other Chinese speaking regions of the world. These two systems use dierent Latin letters
to spell the same Chinese characters. In mainland China, Pinyin is the only ocial system, and names on passports
and other ocial identication must use the Pinyin system.
6
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apartments located on oors ending with an 8 sell in the secondary market at a premium of 235
RMB per square meter (approximately 7%). No price eects are found in the primary market due
to a uniform local pricing policy. In addition to price eects, apartments on oors ending in an 8
sold 6.9 days sooner than apartments on other oors, on average. Using individual data, Shum et al.
(2014) identify individuals with phone numbers that contain multiple 8 s as superstitious individuals
and nd these individuals are more likely to buy an apartment on a oor ending with an 8. Despite
evidence supporting the importance of the number 8, Shum et al. (2014) nd no evidence that the
presence of the number 4 is associated with any price discount.
Other researchers found price eects attributable to Chinese superstition in countries outside
China. Absent identiers for Chinese individuals, Bourassa and Peng (1999) and Fortin et al. (2014)
compare property prices in census units with a large concentration of Chinese to property prices
in other census units. Bourassa and Peng (1999) examine census units in New Zealand and nd
positive price eects associated with 8 s in census units with a large percentage of Chinese residents;
no such eects are found for similar properties in census units with few Chinese residents. Similar to
Bourassa and Peng (1999), Fortin et al. (2014) compare property prices in census units with a large
numbers of Chinese to property prices in other census units in the Canadian city of Vancouver,
British Columbia. Fortin et al. (2014) nd houses with addresses ending in an 8 sell at a 2.5%
premium in the census units with many Chinese residents; in the same census units, addresses that
end in a 4 sell at a 2.2% discount. No price eects are found in census units with relatively few
Chinese residents for either number.
Although Bourassa and Peng (1999) and Fortin et al. (2014) provide highly suggestive evidence
of impacts of Chinese superstition on real estate prices outside China, their price eects must be
attributed to the property and not the individual. Absent any information on the ethnicity of
buyers and sellers, these studies can not identify any individual-level eects attributable to Chinese
buyers or sellers. In contrast, Agarwal et al. (2016) identify individual-level eects in the Singapore
apartment market using explicit Chinese identiers present in the data. Agarwal et al. (2016) nd
Chinese buyers pay a 0.9% premium for apartments with numbers ending in 8 and 1.1% discount for
apartments with numbers ending in 4. Similar to (Agarwal et al., 2016), we identify individual-level
eects, but unlike (Agarwal et al., 2016), we impute ethnicity.
In addition to real estate markets, empirical research has also found Chinese superstition eects
4

in other markets. Woo et al. (2008) and Ng et al. (2010) nd evidence using winning bids for license
plate auctions in Hong Kong. Yang (2011) document that retailers in China manipulate patterns
of numbers appearing on price tags in order to exploit preferences for lucky and unlucky numbers.
Moreover, Yang (2011) conclude that Chinese consumers pay more for retail goods because of this
manipulation.

2.2 Name-Ethnicity Matching
In addition to testing for the eect of cultural preferences on real estate prices, this study develops
a binomial classier for placing individuals into specic ethnic groups based on name. The need for
a name-ethnicity classication scheme is more practical than ideal, and has historically been based
on data available to researchers in the social and biomedical sciences. Treeratpituk and Giles (2012)
put this concisely
unlike names, ethnic information is often unavailable due to practical, political or legal
reasons. (page 1142)
Like most empirical real estate research, we use data from the King County Assessor that includes
buyer and seller names but does not include ethnic identiers.
Motivated by genetic commonalities within ethnic groups, name-ethnic matching has been used
extensively in biomedical research (Coldman et al., 1988; Burchard et al., 2003; Fiscella and Fremont,
2006). A typical approach identies strong predictors of ethnicity using a labeled data set that
includes both the ethnicity and name for each individual. Coldman et al. (1988) use death certicates
that include name and ethnicity, Gill et al. (2005) use surnames and country of origin, and Ambekar
et al. (2009) use names of famous natives obtained from Wikipedia.
In this study, we use Olympic Games rosters for both the United States and China from 1948 to
2012 as a representative list of names from each country. Olympic Games team rosters contain both
males and females, and the team members must meet specic residence and citizenship requirements
in order to appear on the national team for each country. These features makes Olympic Games
team rosters an ideal choice for developing representative lists of names by country when compared
to other potential labeled data sets such as Wikipedia or the Internet Movie Database, Ambekar

5

et al. (2009) and Rachevsky and Pu (2011).89
As names are a specic form of textual data, our method relates to other studies that view
text as data. We use a tokenization approach where units of text are represented by exchangeable
collections of words or tokens. Based on the set of tokens, each text can be scored or classied into
two or more groups. For example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) score news outlets as Republican
or Democrat, Loughran and McDonald (2011) score 10k lings as positive or negative, and Nowak
and Smith (2016) score real estate listings as low quality or high quality. In order to score the text,
researchers can either use a pre-specied dictionary of topic-specic words or build a dictionary
based on a corpus of labeled or unlabeled text. We create a dictionary of Chinese and non-Chinese
names using sparsity-inducing methods similar to Taddy (2013). Using the names and estimated
weights, each name in the assessor data can be scored as either Chinese or not Chinese.
The purpose of the classication procedure is to predict ethnicity for names in the assessor
data. Because of this, the performance of the classier should not be evaluated on in-sample misclassication for the Olympic Games rosters; rather, performance should be evaluated based on
theoretical results for the out-of-sample mis-classication rate of the assessor data. Given the number
of unique names in the Olympic Games rosters is comparable to the number of Olympians, overtting
is likely a problem. Because of this, we use an `1 regularized logistic regression commonly used in
the document classication literature, Hastie et al. (2015). Regularizing the coecients using the

`1 norm yields coecient estimates that result in lower out-of-sample mis-classication compared
to un-regularized estimators and alternative `p coecient regularizations (Ng, 2004). Furthermore,
unlike the maximum likelihood estimator, the regularized estimator is feasible even when the data
are separable (Hastie et al., 2015).

3

Data and Methodology

We estimate an hedonic price model in order to explain observed variation in residential real estate
transaction prices in King County, Washington attributable to the presence of lucky or unlucky
numbers in the address. The hedonic model contains indicator variables for individual buyers and
sellers classied as Chinese. We classify based on name using the rosters of the athletes on the
8
9

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Database_download
http://www.imdb.com/interfaces
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Chinese and US Summer Olympic Games over a 60 year period. The data sources and estimation
methods used are described in detail below.

3.1 Data
The data sets used in this study come from two sources. The rst data set includes the rosters of
all Summer Olympic Games teams from the United States and China beginning 1948 and ending
2012. These data form the basis for the supervised learning algorithm used to identify individuals
as Chinese, as described below. The Summer Olympic rosters were downloaded from the Sports
Reference website.10 Figure 1 shows the 100 most common names appearing in the US and China
national Olympic teams over the 1948-2012 period. In Figure 1, the larger the font size, the more
frequently that name appears on the Summer Olympic Games team rosters.
The second data set comes from the King County Assessor's Oce.11 This data set includes
information on all real estate transactions in King County beginning January 1, 1990 and ending
December 31, 2015. The data set includes information about the property (type of property, type of
transaction, address, etc.), the transaction price, the buyer name, and the seller name. We use data
on sales of single-family homes. After removing 1% of outlying observations based on a preliminary
hedonic regression, the nal sample contains 508,916 single family home sales.12 Summary statistics
for commonly reported property attributes are reported in Table 2. The average residential property
transacted during the sample period was built in 1978, had a price of $330,555, just under 2,000
square feet of living space, 3.3 bedrooms and about 1.5 bathrooms.
We identify individuals as having a Chinese cultural or ethnic background based on name using a binomial classier. After training the classier using names on Olympic Team rosters, we
calculate the probability that a given buyer's name will be found on the Chinese Olympic team
rosters, Pr (ChinaBuyer). Using this probability, we create an indicator variable chinaBuy which
is equal to 1 if 0.8 < Pr (ChinaBuyer) and equal to 0 otherwise. Alternative cuto values for this
indicator variable were considered, but changing the threshold probability across values in the set

{0.55, 0.60, ..., 0.90, 0.95} did not alter the empirical results in any meaningful way. The probabil10

http://www.sports-reference.com/olympics/
http://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/assessor.aspx
12
Based on deed records available on the King County Assessor's website, a signicant portion of the outlying
transactions were found to be associated with non arms-length transactions, inter-family transfers, re damage, or
signicant renovation.
11
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ity Pr (ChinaSeller) and indicator variable chinaSell are created in a similar manner using seller
names.
Summary statistics for the probabilities, indicator variables, and the presence of 8 s and 4 s in
addresses, are shown on Table 2. 4.3% of all buyers are classied as having a name suggesting a
Chinese cultural background and 1.9% of all sellers are classied as such. About 33% of the houses
in the sample have an 8 in the address, and about 45% have a 4 in the address. About 9% of the
homes transacted in the sample have a 4 or 8 as the nal digit in the house price.

3.2 Binomial Classier
For each n = 1, ..., N , dene an indicator variable yn = 1 if the Olympic athlete is on the Chinese
national team and yn = 0 if the Olympic athlete is on the US national team. Using this binary
variable, the probability that an Olympic athlete will be from China is calculated using a logit
function. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, we consider this a binomial
classier.
The explanatory variables for the logit model are created from the full names on Olympic Games
team rosters. We assume each full name, Fn , can be represented as an exchangeable collection of
names or tokens chosen from a set of P names. The exchangeability assumption implies that we make
no distinction between rst and last names. Alternatively, each full name Fn can be represented as a

P × 1 vector Xn with elements Xnp . Here, Xnp = 1 if the pth name is in Fn and Xnp = 0 otherwise.
For instance, the associated vector Xn for American Olympic swimmer Fn = {M ichael, P helps}
has a 1 in the element associated with M ichael, a 1 in the element associated with P helps, and 0
everywhere else. Using these explanatory variables, the probability that yn = 1 is given by

Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ) =

e

P

φ0 +

1+e

p

Xnp φp

P

φ0 +

p

Xnp φp

(1)

In Equation (1), when 0 < φp (φp < 0), the presence of name p increases (decreases) the likelihood
that Fn comes from the Chinese Olympic team roster. When φp = 0, name p does not help to
predict yn . The parameter φ0 controls the unconditional Pr(yn = 1).
For xed P , φp can be consistently estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. In the
Olympic Roster setting, the assumption of xed P is dicult to defend as there are 6,502 unique
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names across N = 9, 836 Olympic athletes from both the US and China. For sets of explanatory
variable with these dimensions, maximum likelihood solutions are at worst degenerate when N < P
and at best unreliable when P ≈ N (Hastie and Qian, 2014). A practical approach decreases P
by ltering out names that occur fewer than C times in the data. In this case, modest ltering
rules result in a large P while more aggressive ltering rules could remove names with signicant
predictive power. We retain the P = 615 names that occur C = 5 or more times in the data. In
unreported results, we nd that the results are not sensitive when using C = 10 or C = 20.
Because P remains large even after ltering out less common names, we utilize a penalized
likelihood procedure that mitigates overtting. In particular, we place an `1 penalty on the individual

φp parameters and minimize the following penalized likelihood function

−

Y

Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ)yn [1 − Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ)]1−yn + λ

X

|φp |

(2)

p

n

The rst term in Equation (2) is the sample likelihood, and the second term represents a penalty on
the coecient vector. The parameter λ is a tuning parameter that controls the penalty.1314 Dene
the solution to Equation (2) as φ∗ (λ). When the context is clear, we omit the dependence on λ and
write φ∗ instead.
The choice of λ determines the size of the penalty on φ. When λ = 0, there is no penalty on

φ and φ∗ (0) is the maximum likelihood estimator. As λ increases, there is a greater penalty on
large φ and φ∗ is shrunk towards the zero vector. Unlike the `2 penalty, the shape of the `1 penalty
yields a sparse solution where some entries of φ∗ can be set equal to 0. As mentioned above, when

φ∗p = 0, token p cannot be used to classify yn . With this interpretation, minimizing Equation (2)
performs both variable selection and coecient estimation. If we were to forgo the logit model and
instead estimate a linear probability model with an `1 penalty on the coecients, the estimator
would become the well-known LASSO estimator, Tibshirani (1996).15
By including the penalty term, φ∗ is less likely to overt the data in-sample and can be used for
meaningful out-of-sample classications (Ng, 2004). For this application, out-of-sample performance
13

In our analysis, we experiment with values near the 5-fold cross-validated λ. The results are robust to λ near the
cross-validated choice of λ
14
We use the glmnet package in R to solve Equation 2. The solution is found by using a quadratic approximation
to the true penalized likelihood.
15
LASSO is an acronym for least absolute shrinkage and selection operator.
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(mis-classication) is fundamental to the results. By creating explanatory variables for buyer and
seller names in the assessor data in the same way, we can then calculate Pr (ChinaBuyer) and

Pr (ChinaSeller) and the associated indicator variables using φ∗ and Equation1.
In addition to out-of-sample considerations, we also prefer the regularized estimator based on
the conguration of the data. P = 615 names may be suciently small compared to N = 9, 836
Olympians to justify use of maximum likelihood methods. However, many names are specic to
either the Chinese or US rosters. For instance, michael is only found on US team rosters. In this
case, the data are considered separable, and the maximum likelihood estimator does not exist as

φ∗michael (0) = −∞.16 However, separable data sets can still be employed using the regularized
estimator in Equation (2) as 0 < λ precludes innite values for φ∗ .

3.3 Multinomial Classier
As discussed above, dierent Chinese and Korean names can be identical when Romanized. In this
situation, the binomial classier might erroneously classify Korean buyers and sellers as Chinese.
Using a multinomial classier instead of a binomial classier in this setting provides two benets.
First and foremost, adding a third type can decrease classication error relative to the binomial
classier. Specically, Romanized names that are common to both China and Korea will not default
to being classied as Chinese as in the binomial classier. Second, extending the classication
scheme by allowing for a Korean type also provides for an interesting falsication test. Unlike
Chinese superstition, there does not exist any evidence that the number 8 is lucky or unlucky in
Korean superstition.
The binomial classier described in the previous section can be generalized to a multinomial
classier using a multinomial likelihood approach. The multinomial classication model contains

k = 1, ..., K types. Each individual n = 1, ..., N is associated with a type yn ∈ {1, ..., K}. Given the
vector Xn , the probability of being type k is given by
16

Using Eq 1, the individual likelihood of a Chinese Olympian, yn = 1, is not aected by φmichael as xn,michael = 0
Q
for all Chinese Olympians. The maximum likelihood estimator maximizes the sample likelihood L(φ) = n Pr(yn =
1|Xn , φ)yn [1 − Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ)]1−yn . Suppose φ1 maximizes L(φ). Now, consider φ2 = φ1 − emichael where emichael
is the basis vector with a 1 in the michael slot and 0 elsewhere. Using Eq 1, Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ2 ) = Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ1 )
for all Chinese Olympians and US Olympians not named michael, Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ1 ) < Pr(yn = 1|Xn , φ2 ) for all US
Olympians names michael. Therefore, L(φ1 ) < L(φ2 ), and φ1 cannot be the maximum likelihood estimator.
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0

eφ0k +Xn φk
Pr(yn = k|Xn , φ) = P φ +X 0 φ
0k
n k
ke

(3)

In Equation (3), φk = (φ1k , ..., φP k )0 is a P × 1 vector of parameters for type k . When 0 < φpk
(φpk < 0), the presence of name p increases (decreases) the likelihood that Fn is type k . In the
interest of out-of-sample performance, φk can be estimated by maximizing a penalized likelihood
similar to Equation 2. Using φ∗k , we calculate probabilities Pr (ChinaBuyer) and Pr (KoreanBuyer)
and create the indicators chinaBuy and koreaBuy using the same 0.8 cuto used in the binomial
classier. Indicators for sellers are created similarly.

3.4 Hedonic Price Model
In order to isolate the response of Chinese buyers and sellers to the presence of certain numbers,
we use the property address recorded in the King County Assessors Oce real estate transactions
database. In these data, the property address includes both the building number and street number.
For example, 248 Main Street has a single 8 in the address while 248 8th Street has two 8 s in the
address. In the transaction data, we convert all character representations of numbers to numerics.
For instance, 248 Eighth Street is converted to 248 8th Street.
Indicator variables for the presence of 8 s and 4 s are created using the property address. The
variable any8 = 1 if there is any 8 in the property address and any8 = 0 otherwise. The variable

total8 is equal to the total number of 8 s in the property address. In order to determine if the building
number and street have dierent eects, we set buildingAny8 = 1 if the building number contains an

8 and buildingAny8 = 0 otherwise. Following Fortin et al. (2014), we also create buildingLast8 = 1
if the last digit of the house number is equal to 8 and set buildingLast8 = 0 otherwise. Indicators
for the number 4 are created in a similar manner. As an example, a single family home at 248 8th
Street would have any8=1, buildingAny8=1, buildingLast8=1, total8=2, any4=1, buildingAny4=1,

buildingLast4=0, and total4=1.
We estimate a hedonic model in order to determine if individuals with a Chinese cultural background are willing to pay more or less for a single family home based on the numbers found in the
address. We estimate the following hedonic price model for house i in zip code z sold at time period

t

11

pizt = xizt β + ψzizt + µzt + uizt .

(4)

In Equation 4, pizt is the log of the sale price, xict includes the log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and age of the property, zizt includes indicator variables for Chinese (chinaBuy , chinaSell),
numbers appearing in the street address (any8, buildingAny8, etc.), and the relevant interaction
terms (any8 × chinaBuy , any8 × chinaSell, etc.), µzt is a Zip Code - Year xed-eect that captures
time-varying unobservable neighborhood heterogeneity, and uizt is an unobservable error term capturing other factors that aect residential property transaction prices. We two way cluster-correct
the estimated standard errors in Equation (4) at the Zip Code and year level.
In Equation (4), the coecients for chinaBuy and chinaSell indicate if Chinese buyers or sellers,
respectively, pay more or less for residential properties regardless of the numbers in the address.
When the coecient on chinaBuy is positive, Chinse buyers pay a premium when purchasing a
residential property. Of course, as the hedonic model will never fully capture the true quality of a
property, and a positive coecient on chinaBuy can also indicate that individuals with a Chinese
background purchase properties with higher unobserved quality.
Our primary variables of interest are the interaction terms like any8×chinaBuy . The coecient
on any8 × chinaBuy indicates any premium or discount Chinese pay when purchasing properties
with any 8 s in the property address. This premium or discount is attributable solely to the numbers
in the property address and, by the inclusion of chinaBuy as a stand-alone coecient, is in addition
to any market wide premium paid by Chinese buyers. If Chinese buyers factor in Chinese superstition
when purchasing a property, we expect the coecient on any8 × chinaBuy and other interaction
terms that include chinaBuy and 8 s to be positive.
If properties that include 8 s purchased by Chinese are of higher quality, a positive coecient on

any8 × chinaBuy could indicate unobserved quality and not the inuence of Chinese superstitions.
Estimates of the coecient on the interaction term any8 × chinaSell can help address this problem.
If the estimated coecient on any8 × chinaSell is not dierent from 0, this is strong evidence that
properties sold by Chinese with an 8 in the address are not of higher or lower quality than other
properties. Altogether, both a statistically positive coecient estimate on any8 × chinaBuy and a
coecient estimate indistinguishable from zero on any8×chinaSell indicates Chinese buyers paying
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a premium for properties based solely on the presence of an 8 in the address irrespective of the
unobserved quality of the property.
In contrast to Bourassa and Peng (1999) and Fortin et al. (2014) who interact an indicator
variable for census units that include a large portion of Chinese, say chineseT ract, with indicators
for 8 in the address, we identify Chinese buyers and sellers.17 This subtle dierence is important if
non-Chinese recognize the eects of Chinese superstitions and purchase properties for speculative
purposes. That is, a positive coecient on any8 × chineseT ract can indicate a positive price eect
for the number 8 for both Chinese and non-Chinese alike. In contrast, a positive coecient on

any8 × chinaBuy identies a positive price eect specic to Chinese buyers.

4

Results

4.1 Ethnic-Name Matching
The ethnic name matching procedure is a key element of the empirical analysis. Figure 2 shows the
solution path, φ∗ (λ), for various values of λ in Equation (2). Figure 2 shows both the size of the
coecients and the number of non-zero coecients increasing as λ decreases. Furthermore, Figure 2
indicates that each coecient becomes non-zero at dierent values of λ. For large values of λ, only
the names that are the strongest predictors have non-zero φ∗ . Therefore, the choice of λ directly
determines both the dictionary of Chinese and US names (variable selection) and the predictive
power of the names (coecient estimation).
The choice of λ is determined using a cross-validation procedure. λcv is the 5-fold cross-validated
choice of λ, and λ1se is the largest λ such that the median cross-validated log-likelihood is within
one standard error of the log-likelihood evaluated at λcv . Although some practitioners favor using

φ∗ (λ1se ) as it is more conservative in terms of both variable selection and coecient estimation
(Hastie et al., 2015), parameter estimates from Equation (4) are nearly identical when using either

λcv or λ1se . Therefore, we report only the results using φ∗ (λcv ), hereafter, φ∗cv .
Estimates of φ∗cv , the name matching parameter from Equation (1), along with the largest
estimated values are displayed in Table 1. Names that most strongly predict being on the United
17
Bourassa and Peng (1999) identify tracts based on immigration and Fortin et al. (2014) identify tracts based on
census data.
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States Olympic team roster are kevin, amy, michael. Names that most strongly predict being on the
Chinese Olympic team roster are li, yin, xu. Using Equation 1, the implied Pr(yn = 1) for kevin,

amy, michael is equal to 0 when rounding to 6 digits; the implied Pr(yn = 1) for li, yin, xu is equal
to 1. Thus, the presence of any of these names alone in any buyer or seller name is a strong indicator
of ethnicity.
Not surprisingly, the strongest predictors are names that are among the most frequent names in
Figure 1. However, there is not a monotonic relationship between frequency and predictive power.
For instance, dan, lou, lee, long are found on both Chinese and United States Olympic team rosters;

dan occurs 17 (39) times in the United States (Chinese) Olympic rosters and is not a strong indicator
of ethnicity. As mentioned above, the `1 penalty in Equation 2 is such that φ∗cv for weak predictors
are set exactly to 0. The associated φ∗cv for the 15 names that occur in both the Chinese and US
rosters are equal to 0 indicating that these 15 names cannot be used to predict ethnicity in the
assessor data.
Using φ∗cv , the probability that a buyer or seller is Chinese can be calculated using Equation
1. Figure 3 displays the empirical cumulative distribution for these probabilities for the entire
set of buyers and sellers. In the data, 3.5% of the transactions have a buyer name with 0.95 <

Pr(ChineseBuyer). A manual inspection of the names by several Chinese nationals conrms this
high predicted probability. Based on Figure 3, our cuto probability of 0.8 for the indicator variable
appears to be appropriate. As indicated in Table 2, 4.3% of transactions are classied as involving
Chinese buyers, and 1.9% of transactions involve Chinese sellers. Figure 4 shows the fraction of
transactions that included either a Chinese buyer or seller over the sample period. The fraction of
Chinese buyers increased at a steady rate beginning in 1990 through 2008. After 2008, the fraction
of Chinese buyers increased more rapidly, peaking at more than 8% of all buyers in 2013. In contrast,
the percentage of Chinese sellers exhibits more steady growth rate throughout the sample period.
The percentage of Chinese buyers and sellers varies across locations in Seattle. Figure 5 shows
the fraction of Chinese buyers in King County by census tract and Figure 6 shows the locations of
the individual properties associated with Chinese buyers. Although transactions involving Chinese
buyers are distributed throughout King County, signicant clusters of transactions involving Chinese
buyers can be seen on Figure 6. The fraction of Chinese buyers appears to be highly concentrated
in two locations where more than 20% of buyers are identied as Chinese by the binomial classier.
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Similar high home ownership rates and clustering patterns among Chinese is also reported by Painter
et al. (2004) in their study using data from the Los Angeles Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical
Area.
One cluster of Chinese buyers is in the Beacon Hill area of Seattle just east of I-5 and the SeattleTacoma International Airport. It is interesting to note that the Chinatown International-District is
located 3 miles north of the Beacon Hill area.18 The other location is the Newcastle / Cougar Hills
area south of I-90 and east of I-405.
The names with the largest coecients for each country in the multinomial classier are presented in Table 4. Not surprisingly, the strongest predictors for Chinese names in the multinomial
model are comparable to the strongest names in the binomial model given in Table 1. The total
number of buyers and sellers for each type are presented in Table 5. The total number of Chinese
buyers and sellers in Table 5 is fewer than the total numbers in Table 3. A comparison of the counts
in the two tables indicates that the binomial classier is classifying buyers and sellers in the assessor
data as Chinese who are classied as Korean when using the multinomial classier.

4.2 Hedonic Results for the Binomial Classier
We use four alternative specications for the hedonic model in Equation 4 that contain dierent
indicator variables for the presence of lucky and unlucky numbers in addresses in dierent forms.
These alternative models help establish the robustness of the results. Model 1 contains any8 or

any4 and interactions with chinaBuy and chinaSell. Model 2 uses total8 or total4. Model 3 uses
buildingAny8 or buildingAny4. The nal model specication, Model 4, contains an indicator variable
(buildingLast8 or buildingLast4 ) for the presence of an 8 or 4 as the last digit of the house number.
This specication in Model 4 matches the one used by Fortin et al. (2014). We interact the indicator
variables for lucky and unlucky numbers in addresses with indicator variables for Chinese buyers
and sellers, which allows for the eect of Chinese superstition to vary depending on which party in
the transaction has these preferences.
The results for the hedonic regression model dened by in Equation (4) are presented in Table
6. All models contain indicator variables for transactions with Chinese buyers and sellers. The
estimated parameters on these stand-alone indicator variables are all negative and statistically
18

http://www.visitseattle.org/visitor-information/
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dierent from zero; Chinese buyers and sellers in King County tend to purchase single family homes
at a discount relative to other buyers. This price eect could reect a preference of Chinese for timeinvariant low-quality properties. Alternatively, this price eect could also reect the time-varying
condition of the property or features specic to the transacting parties. For example, Chinese could
purchase high-quality properties that are currently in poor condition.19 The discount could also
be an indication that Chinese have bargaining power relative to the average seller, Harding et al.
(2003). However, we nd the bargaining power explanation unlikely as the coecient on chinaSell
is also negative and smaller than the coecient on chinaBuy.
The results from Model 1 suggest no signicant discount for a property address with an 8 in
the address across King County. The parameters of interest are the estimates on the interaction of

any8 and with the indicators for Chinese buyers and sellers. The interation parameter estimates on
Table 6 indicate that Chinese buyers pay a 1.7% premium for property addresses that include an 8.
Chinese sellers receive a 1.4% premium when selling a property with an 8 in the address, no matter
what the ethnicity of the buyer. The premium when selling is puzzling but could represent either
model mis-specication or mis-classication of Chinese buyers and sellers when using the binomial
classier. The premium when selling could also indicate a larger reservation price for Chinese who
currently derive utility from properties than include an 8 in the address.
Columns 2 - 4 on Table 6 investigate alternative specications for the presence of 8 s in addresses.
Model 2 includes a variable reecting the total number of 8 s in the property address. Again, the
presence of an 8 in an address does not carry any premium in the overall sample. However, Chinese
home buyers are willing to pay a 1.4% premium for each additional 8 in a home's address. Chinese
sellers receive a 0.9% premium for each additional 8 in an address; however, this result is only
signicant at the 5% level. Model 3 includes an indicator variable for the presence of an 8 anywhere
in the building address. Results from Model 3 indicate that buyer and seller premiums for 8 s
appearing in the house number are similar to the premium for an 8 anywhere in the address.
Model 4, shown on in column 4 on Table 6, contains an indicator variable for houses where the
nal digit of the house number is 8. The average single family home transaction in King County
involving a property with an 8 as the nal digit of the house number does not carry any premium
19

Here, we use quality to dene the time-invariant or slowly-varying state of the property (location to amenities,
neighborhood quality, school district, etc.) and condition to indicate the time-varying state of the property (re
damage, ood damage, renovated kitchen, new roof, etc.).
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when compared to other properties. However, results in Table 6 echo the same puzzling result from
Model 1 where Chinese sellers command a 2.1% premium.
Table 7 presents a similar analysis using 4 s in addresses. Again, Chinese buyers purchase single
family homes for a price 2.0% to 2.4% below average and sell single family homes at a price about
5.3% below average in King County. Similar to Fortin et al. (2014), Models 1-3 nd no evidence
that Chinese buyers react to the presence of 4 in the address. However, Model 4 indicates Chinese
buyers pay a 1.2% discount when the last digit of the house number is a 4.
The results from the binomial classier suggest that single family home transaction prices in
Seattle, Washington reect cultural preferences for lucky and unlucky numbers. King County has
a diverse population that included about 15% of the population identifying themselves as Asian
in the 2010 Census. This is a substantially more diverse ethnic mix than the setting examined by
Agarwal et al. (2016) and Shum et al. (2014), who analyze the premium (discount) associated with
the presence of 8 (4 ) in majority Chinese settings. Chinese in Seattle interact more frequently with
people from a western background than residents of China or Singapore, and are also continually
bombarded by media with a western orientation. Some Seattle residents identied as Chinese could
be second, third forth or more generation Chinese-Americans. These results suggest that Chinese
cultural preferences for specic numbers persist over time, and in the presence of signicant interaction with, and exposure to non-Chinese cultural preferences.
The estimated premia associated with the presence of 8 s in addresses, and the estimated discount
associated with the presence of 4 s in addresses, in this paper are smaller than those reported in
Fortin et al. (2014), and substantially smaller than those reported in Shum et al. (2014). The data
used by Shum et al. (2014) come from a city in China, where cultural preferences for numbers should
be substantially stronger than in Seattle. Fortin et al. (2014) have no information about the ethnicity
of buyers and sellers; instead, they exploit information about the demographic characteristics of the
Census Tracts where the houses are located in Vancouver.

4.3 Hedonic Results for Multinomial Classier
We next present results when using the multinomial classier to classify buyer and seller ethnicity.
Results for Chinese buyers are presented in Table 8, and results for Korean buyers are presented
in Table 9. The results for the Chinese buyers and sellers are comparable to the results in Table 6;
17

the results from the previous section are robust to use of the multinomial classier. We nd further
evidence that Chinese buyers are willing to pay a slight premium for properties that include an

8 in the address. Interestingly, the puzzling, statistically signicant result for the buildingLast8 ×
chinaSell variable in Table 6 is no longer signicant in Table 8. The disappearance of this signicance
indicates that the multinomial classier is preferred to the binomial classier in terms of its ability
to assign ethnicity to buyers and sellers in the sample.
More importantly, as expected, we nd that Korean buyers do not pay a premium for properties
that include an 8 in the address. As a whole, the null result for Koreans in Table 9 and the signicance for Chinese buyers in Table 8 provide two important implications. First, there is evidence
that Chinese buyers factor in Chinese superstition and are willing to pay more for properties that
include 8 s in the address. This result is robust to any mis-classication attributable to the Romanization of Chinese characters. Second, the multinomial classier generates a simple counterfactual:
the absence of any signicant price eects for Korean buyers and sellers gives further credence to
the signicant results found among Chinese buyers and sellers in the sample.

5

Conclusion

A growing body of evidence suggests that superstition is manifest in economic outcomes. We use
a novel approach to identify the ethnicity of home buyers and sellers in King County, Washington
over a fteen year period. The results reveal that the presence of the number 8 in an address has
a expected premium for Chinese buyers of 1.7%. A similar premium also exists in other numeric
formats, including the total number of 8 s in the address and an 8 as the nal digit of the house
number. However, the presence of the number 4 in an address does not generate a substantial
discount.
The results in this paper extend economists' understanding of the extent to which superstition
can aect economic outcomes. The city of Seattle is ethnically and culturally diversity, and many
of the ethnic Chinese buying and selling houses during the study period could have lived in the
US for generations. The presence of a statistically signicant relationship between a proxy for the
presence of cultural preferences for specic numbers and single family home prices indicates Chinese
superstition is relatively durable and still present in Chinese living in America.
18

In addition, the supervised learning approach to identifying ethnicity based only on names used
here can be applied in a number of other settings where quantitative data on language is used (Davis
and Abdurazokzoda, 2015). Researchers often use data where names are available but information
on ethnicity is not. For example, government regulators, elected ocials, political candidates, CEOs,
Corporate Board members, judges, and athletes on professional sports teams are often identied by
name. However, information about their ethnic background is often limited but is still of signicant
interest to researchers. The supervised learning approach used here can be applied in all of these
settings in order to assess the likely ethnic background of individuals.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Olympic Athlete Names and Logit Coecients
PANEL A: 10 Strongest Predictors for United States Olympians
Name

Count

Relative Frequency

c∗
φ

kevin
amy
michael
mike
bob
jim
bill
tom
steve
mark

40
29
67
112
91
89
95
81
72
57

0.004
0.003
0.007
0.011
0.009
0.009
0.010
0.008
0.007
0.006

-6.593
-5.824
-5.514
-5.460
-5.378
-5.327
-5.326
-5.285
-5.184
-5.145

PANEL B: 10 Strongest Predictors for Chinese Olympians
Name

Count

Relative Frequency

c∗
φ

li
yin
xu
liu
sun
lin
song
guo
yu
zhu

274
10
60
138
61
42
26
37
52
42

0.028
0.001
0.006
0.014
0.006
0.004
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.004

5.775
5.764
5.712
5.701
5.679
5.468
5.239
5.181
5.146
5.111

c∗ s) for the United
Table 1 shows the 10 strongest predictors for Summer Olympic national team members (φ
States and China based on the penalized logit estimator dened by Equation 2. Count is the total number
of times the name appears on both rosters; Relative Frequency is the percentage of times the name appears
c∗ . Coecients with more
on both rosters. The strength of the predictor is based on the absolute value of φ
negative (positive) values are strong indicators of a name coming from the United States (Chinese) Summer
Olympic team.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Statistic
Sale Price ($1,000s)
Square Feet of Living Space
Year Built
Bedrooms
Bathrooms
Sale Year
pr(Chinese Seller)
pr(Chinese Buyer)
chinaSell
chinaBuy
Any 8 in Address
Last Digit 8 in Address
Any 4 in Address
Last Digit 4 in Address

Min

Mean

Median

Max

St. Dev.

45.000
480
1900
1
1
1990
0.000
0.000
0
0
0
0
0
0

330.555
1,986.760
1967.660
3.328
1.498
2002.143
0.041
0.061
0.019
0.043
0.332
0.088
0.453
0.096

275.000
1,880
1972
3
1
2002
0.002
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0

1,700.000
4,850
2014
6
3
2015
1.000
1.000
1
1
1
1
1
1

208.834
775.857
27.600
0.841
0.590
6.621
0.125
0.191
0.136
0.203
0.471
0.283
0.498
0.295

Real estate transaction data comes from the King County Assessor's Oce.

23

Table 3: Number of Identifying Transactions, Binomial Classier
Variable

Count

Chinese Seller
Chinese Buyer
Any 8 in Address (any8)
Last digit 8 in address (buildingLast8)
Any 4 in Address any4)
Last digit 4 in address (buildingLast4)

9,570
21,853
169,182
44,748
230,520
48,966

The Chinese ethnicity indicator variables chinaBuy and chinaSell are created using the binomial classier.
any8 is an indicator for the presence of any 8 in the address. buildingLast8 is an indicator if the house
number ends in an 8. any4 is an indicator for the presence of any 4 in the address. buildingLast4 is an
indicator if the house number ends in a 4
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Table 4: Olympic Athlete Names and 10 Largest Multinomial Coecients
China

c∗
φ

Korea

c∗
φ

United States

c∗
φ

li
8.838 yeong 8.778 kevin
6.872
liu
8.782 cheol 8.773 white
5.873
xu
8.404 choi
8.702 michael
4.329
zhu
8.313 ja
8.523 amy
3.777
zhou
8.273 sin
8.487 david
3.215
xie
8.190 hye
8.286 mike
3.091
he
8.179 won
8.273 ann
3.070
zhao
8.159 seung 8.248 bob
3.011
guo
8.140 seong 8.022 bill
3.010
shen
7.979 yeo
7.604 mary
2.992
Table 4 shows the 10 largest estimated regression coecients associated with Chinese, Korean, and American
names from the multinomial classier.
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Table 5: Multinomial Classier Transaction Counts
Ethnicity Indicator

Number of Transactions

chinaSell
chinaBuy
koreaSell
koreaBuy

7,464
19,287
2,784
4,495

The ethnicity indicator variables chinaBuy and chinaSell, koreaBuy , and koreaSell are created using the
multinomial classier.
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Table 6: Buyer and Seller Ethnicity and 8 s in Addresses, Binomial Classier

chinaSell
chinaBuy
any8
any8 × chinaSell
any8 × chinaBuy

Model 1
−0.055∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.001
(0.003)
0.014∗∗
(0.005)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.004)

total8

Model 2
−0.054∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.007)

Model 3
−0.053∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.028∗∗∗
(0.006)

0.000
(0.003)
0.009∗
(0.004)
0.014∗∗∗
(0.003)

total8 × chinaSell
total8 × chinaBuy
buildingAny8

0.001
(0.003)
0.012
(0.006)
0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)

buildingAny8 × chinaSell
buildingAny8 × chinaBuy
buildingLast8
buildingLast8 × chinaSell
buildingLast8 × chinaBuy
Num. obs.
R2 (full model)
Zip Code - Year FE

Model 4
−0.052∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.025∗∗∗
(0.006)

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

0.002
(0.001)
0.018∗∗
(0.006)
0.003
(0.004)
508916
0.871
Y

< 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. chinaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and chinaBuy is an indicator for a Chinese buyer. Individuals are
classied as either Chinese or non-Chinese using the logit classier in Equation 1. any8 is an indicator
for the presence of any 8 in the address. total8 is the total number of 8 s in the address. building8
is an indicator for the presence of an 8 in the house number. buildingLast8 is an indicator for house
numbers ending in an 8.

∗∗∗ p
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Table 7: Buyer and Seller Ethnicity and 4 s in Addresses, Binomial Classier

chinaSell
chinaBuy
any4
any4 × chinaSell
any4 × chinaBuy

Model 1
−0.052∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.028∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.004
(0.003)
0.004
(0.005)
0.007
(0.005)

total4

Model 2
−0.053∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.028∗∗∗
(0.006)

Model 3
−0.053∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

0.003
(0.003)
0.004
(0.004)
0.005
(0.003)

total4 × chinaSell
total4 × chinaBuy
buildingAny4

0.001
(0.002)
0.006
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.004)

buildingAny4 × chinaSell
buildingAny4 × chinaBuy
buildingLast4
buildingLast4 × chinaSell
buildingLast4 × chinaBuy
Num. obs.
R2
Zip Code - Year FE

Model 4
−0.051∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

−0.003
(0.001)
0.006∗
(0.003)
−0.012∗∗
(0.004)
508916
0.871
Y

< 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. chinaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and chinaBuy is an indicator for a Chinese buyer. Individuals are
classied as either Chinese or non-Chinese using the logit classier in Equation 1. any4 is an indicator
for the presence of any 4 in the address. total4 is the total number of 4 s in the address. building4 is
an indicator for the presence of a 4 in the house number. buildingLast4 is an indicator if the house
number ends in a 4.

∗∗∗ p
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Table 8: Ethnicity and 8 s in Addresses, Multinomial Classier
chinaSell
chinaBuy
any8
any8 × chinaSell
any8 × chinaBuy

Model 1
−0.058∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
0.014∗∗
(0.005)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)

total8

Model 2
−0.056∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.003)

Model 3
−0.056∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.033∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.000
(0.001)
0.008
(0.004)
0.015∗∗∗
(0.003)

total8 × chinaSell
total8 × chinaBuy
buildingAny8

0.001
(0.001)
0.011
(0.006)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.004)

buildingAny8 × chinaSell
buildingAny8 × chinaBuy
buildingLast8
buildingLast8 × chinaSell
buildingLast8 × chinaBuy
Num. obs.
R2
Zip Code - Year FE

Model 4
−0.055∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.002)

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

0.002∗
(0.001)
0.019∗
(0.008)
0.007
(0.005)
508916
0.871
Y

< 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. chinaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and chinaBuy is an indicator for a Chinese buyer. Individuals are
classied as either Chinese, Korean or non-Chinese using the multinomial classier in Equation 3.
any8 is an indicator for the presence of any 8 in the address. total8 is the total number of 8s in the
address. building8 is an indicator for the presence of an 8 in the house number. buildingLast8 is an
indicator if the house number ends in an 8.

∗∗∗ p
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Table 9: Koreans and 8 s in Addresses, Multinomial Classier

koreaSell
koreaBuy
any8
any8 × koreaSell
any8 × koreaBuy

Model 1
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.007
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.007)
0.007
(0.006)

total8

Model 2
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)

Model 3
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)

0.001
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.006)
0.008
(0.005)

total8 × koreaSell
total8 × koreaBuy
buildingAny8

0.001
(0.001)
0.005
(0.008)
0.012
(0.007)

buildingAny8 × koreaSell
buildingAny8 × koreaBuy
buildingLast8
buildingLast8 × koreaSell
buildingLast8 × koreaBuy
Num. obs.
R2
Zip Code - Year FE

Model 4
−0.029∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.008∗
(0.003)

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

508916
0.871
Y

0.003∗∗
(0.001)
0.003
(0.013)
0.010
(0.010)
508916
0.871
Y

< 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05. Standard errors cluster corrected at Zip Code-year level. koreaSell
is an indicator for a Chinese seller, and koreaBuy is an indicator for a Korean buyer. Individuals are
classied as either Chinese, Korean or non-Chinese using the multinomial classier in Equation 3.
any8 is an indicator for the presence of any 8 in the address. total8 is the total number of 8 s in the
address. building8 is an indicator for the presence of an 8 in the house number. buildingLast8 is an
indicator if the house number ends in an 8.

∗∗∗ p
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Figure 1: Olympic Athlete Names
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100 most frequent names appearing on the Summer Olympic Games rosters for each country. More frequent
names are indicated with a larger font.
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Figure 2: Solution Path for φ∗ (λ)
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(a) Figure 2 displays φ∗ (λ) for various λ. φ∗ (λ) is the solution to Equation 2. As λ → 0, the penalty on the
coecients decreases, and φ∗ (λ) becomes the maximum-likelihood estimator. Because of the shape of the
`1 penalty, φ∗p (λ) = 0 for some p. λcv is the 5-fold cross-validated and λ1se is the largest λ such that the
cross-validated log-likelihood is within 1 standard error of the cross-validated log-likelihood when evaluated
at λcv .
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Figure 3: Chinese Buyers and Sellers Over Time
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Figure 3 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function for the probability that a residential property
buyer [Pr(Chinese Buyer)] and seller [Pr(Chinese Seller)] for each transaction in the assessor data was
identied as Chinese by the ethnic-name matching procedure. Pr(Chinese Buyer) and Pr(Chinese Seller) are
calculated using the stated buyer and seller names for each transaction, the estimated coecients φ∗ and
Equation 1.
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Figure 4: Chinese Buyers and Sellers Over Time
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Figure 4 displays the number of Chinese Buyers and Chinese Sellers as a percentage of total transactions
over time.
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Figure 5: Fraction of Chinese Single Family Home Buyers by Census Tract
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Figure 5 shows the number of Chinese single family home buyers in a given census tract as a percentage of
total single family home transactions in the census tract. Total transactions begin January 1990 and end
December 2015.
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Figure 6: Location of Single Family Homes Purchased by Chinese Buyers

Figure 6 identies the locations of single family homes bought by an individual identied as Chinese in
Seattle over the period January 1990 to December 2015.
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